This study presents field evidence from a "Big Three" US automaker that an accounting system that fails to separately account for excess capacity, along with the use of short-term financial metrics for evaluating production managers encourages excess production. Field interviews further reveal that excess production is associated with greater customer incentives necessary to sell excess inventory. While excess production increases contribution in the short-term, we conjecture that it also leads to increases in discretionary costs in the medium-term (e.g., advertising) and harms brand image in the long-term. Using archival data from the auto industry, we empirically establish a positive link between excess capacity and excess production, suggesting that our field evidence holds more generally. We further find that excess production is positively associated with three tangible costs: rebate percent, advertising spend, and our proxy for inventory build-up. Finally, we show that rebate percent, rebate penetration, and inventory build-up are negatively associated with brand image as measured by the JD Power APEAL index. Our combined field and archival results show a complex interplay between production planning, performance measurement, and accounting practices within organizations, with implications for tangible costs and the intangible asset of brand image.
Introduction
It is well recognized in the academic and business community that accounting and performance measurement systems have powerful influences on managerial decisions. While extant literature in accounting has examined the effect of incentives on a variety of outcomes such as managerial effort, earnings management, budget padding, etc., the effect of accounting and performance measurement systems on production decisions and the impact of these decisions on intangible assets is relatively underexplored (Ashton 2005) . When managers make production decisions, greater consideration is typically placed on the effect of those decisions on short-term financial costs and revenues and, as a result, the long-term impact of such decisions on intangible assets is rarely considered. One reason for this omission is that intangible assets require a long-term decision frame, as well as the use of non-financial measures to identify and track their values, neither of which are common features of traditional accounting systems.
In this research, we use field evidence as well as archival data from the US auto industry and examine the effect of capacity accounting and performance measurement systems on production decisions, and the impact of those production decisions on both tangible costs and on an important intangible asset, i.e., brand image, that prior research (e.g., Kim et al. 2003) shows has long-term performance consequences. In the first part of the paper, we provide field evidence that failure to account for excess capacity, combined with a performance measurement system that places considerable emphasis on short-term costs, leads managers to significantly overproduce relative to our proxy for expected demand and, in turn, to increase customer incentives in order to sell the excess production. In the second part of the paper, we use archival data for 132 nameplates (e.g., Chrysler Grand Cherokee, Honda Accord) for 23 automakers to investigate the extent to which our field evidence holds more generally. Specifically, we examine the association between excess capacity and excess production, and the effect of excess production on tangible costs such as customer incentives, advertising, and inventory build-up, and ultimately on the intangible cost of brand image erosion.
The US auto industry provides an excellent research setting to empirically examine the determinants and economic effects of excess production for three reasons. First, the US auto industry during the period of study, [2005] [2006] , has high levels of excess capacity arising, in part, from increased foreign competition. Second, the industry is characterized by high fixed costs. Third, as described in our field evidence, firms in the industry have a short-term oriented incentive structure that focuses on improving short-term contribution margins. Because production decisions by managers are influenced by capacity accounting and short-term incentives as discussed below, incentives for overproducing are high in this industry.
This industry is also relevant to the research question from a managerial perspective.
Industry analysts have observed the tendency for US automakers to overproduce vehicles relative to demand and to use liberal customer incentives to sell the excess production, as compared to foreign automakers, notably Japanese firms, that produce to demand and make judicious use of incentives (Boudette and White 2007) . These analysts express concerns about the implications of overproduction on long-term profitability (Ingrassia 2002) . One analyst notes, "GM has had to continue discounting and dump thousands of Chevy HHRs into rental fleets, which eroded the margin on the car, and badly watered down its cachet" (Stoll and White 2007) . Another writes, To return to profit in the US, GM -after years of selling cars mainly with the help of heavy discounts -needs to build more appealing vehicles and persuade consumers to pay full price for them. To do that, it has to stop making more vehicles than the market demands, or risk triggering a new cycle of discounting. (Boudette and White 2007) We first explore the role of capacity accounting and performance measurement systems in production decisions. An important factor that influences production decisions in firms is the treatment of capacity costs by accounting systems. Cooper and Kaplan (1992) argue that conventional accounting systems do not adequately distinguish between the cost of resources supplied in advance of the period (i.e., investments in production capacity), and the cost of resources used in the production process. The difference between the cost of resources supplied and resources used is the cost of unused capacity. Unused capacity (both desirable and undesirable) arises for several reasons including lumpiness of fixed resource acquisitions, demand fluctuations, and long-term contracts with employees and suppliers. By using budgeted production volume as the denominator for computing cost driver rates, traditional accounting systems confound the cost of unused capacity with the cost of resources used. As a result, cost driver rates and computed product costs vary over time with budgeted volume. Moreover, these variations in budgeted volume are caused by demand fluctuations that arise from factors outside the control of the manager. If performance measurement and control systems do not recognize the variance in cost caused by fluctuations in the denominator volume, distorted managerial incentives arise (Fry, Steele, and Saladin 1995) . To absorb the period overhead costs, managers have incentives to increase production (even in excess of market demand), as long as short-run contribution margins are positive (Balakrishnan and Sprinkle 2002) . While this may be the optimal short-term economic decision, such overproduction can give rise to a significant increase in discretionary costs in the medium term (e.g., increased advertising) and harm brand image in the long-term.
In the first part of this paper, we use field evidence from a "Big Three" US automaker to show that a failure to account for excess capacity is associated with overproduction relative to "free" (i.e., non-incentivized) market demand. The excess capacity in this firm is a result of potentially suboptimal capacity investment decisions as well as a decline in the market share of US automakers relative to foreign automakers, notably Japanese firms. As such, the excess capacity is outside the control of the firm's middle and lower level managers and should be excluded when unit costs are computed for performance measurement and evaluation purposes.
However, our field interviews reveal the presence of an accounting system that focuses on the absorption of all costs, but fails to separately account for excess capacity costs. In addition, a substantial portion of the overhead costs (the numerator) are committed due to long-term supply contracts. When production volume (the denominator) is higher, unit costs are lower. The firm has a balanced scorecard for production managers as well as executives, which places considerable emphasis on short-term costs and profits. Our conversations with the managers at this firm indicate that the combination of improper accounting for capacity combined with a performance measurement system that focuses on short-term costs and profits are important drivers of excess production decisions at this firm.
We next turn to the negative consequence of overproduction. For example, when firms overproduce, significant costs related to storage, obsolescence, and damage of unsold inventory can accrue. Another negative consequence that has been identified by the business press is that to sell the excess production, firms have to increase the extent of incentives provided to customers.
This has the potential to reduce the firm's brand image if customers perceive the discounted brand to be inferior. Although the goal of overproduction is to increase revenues and improve the short-term financial situation of the firm, the increased long-term costs of brand image erosion can be significant. Conventional wisdom suggests that overproduction and providing customer incentives has negative brand image effects for firms engaging in such practices (Styhre and Kohn 2006) , and previous research shows that prices function as a signal of quality to consumers (Kalita, Jagpal and Lehmann 2004) . Higher customer incentives can therefore be considered as a signal of lower quality with potentially negative consequences for the brand image of a firm.
However, prior academic literature has not empirically examined whether excess production influences brand image. The effect of excess production on short-term revenues is more readily apparent than its effect on deterioration in brand image, because most traditional accounting systems are not designed to enable managers to assess or identify changes in brand image.
The second part of this paper takes an important step in this direction. Using archival data from the US auto industry, we first examine the effect of excess capacity on excess production, and the result of excess production on discretionary tangible costs that are easily identifiable by the accounting system such as customer incentives (e.g., rebates), advertising spend, and inventory buildup. Second, we examine the effect of customer incentives, advertising, and inventory build-up on the intangible cost of brand image erosion. We conduct empirical analysis at the level of the product nameplate for the US auto industry. Our empirical results indicate that excess capacity is a significant driver of excess production. Every percentage point of excess capacity is associated with a 0.49 percentage point increase in excess production, i.e., production above year-ahead estimated production. Taken together with our insights from the field, these results indicate that traditional accounting and performance measurement systems encourage excess production in the presence of excess capacity. Third, we find a positive association between excess production and customer incentives and conclude that firms are indeed using incentives to dispose excess production (as opposed to using customer incentives as an overall sales strategy).
1 Fourth, excess production is associated with an increase in advertising spend and our proxy for inventory build-up. Finally, we find that higher customer incentives are negatively associated with our measure of brand image, the JD Power APEAL Index. Every additional one percent of rebate is associated with a two point decline in the APEAL index; a one percent increase in rebate penetration is associated with a 0.2 point decline in the index. Inventory buildup is also negatively associated with brand image. These archival results confirm our field evidence that suggests managers focus on the short-term contribution margin benefits of increased production. They fail to incorporate into the production decision (i) the resulting increase in tangible costs necessary to dispose of the excess inventory (which are captured in the accounting system but likely not until a period subsequent to the production decision), and (ii) the potential harmful effects on brand image (not captured in the accounting system).
This study is important because it shows that the cost-benefit tradeoffs of production decisions may be suboptimal if firms use a short-term accounting approach rather than a longterm approach that considers intangible costs. In addition, it responds to recent calls (e.g., Ashton 2005) for the identification and testing of value-based financial and non-financial measures that can be used by managers within and outside the firm for identifying, measuring, creating, and monitoring intangible assets. Specifically, an important implication of this study is that the inclusion of (likely non-financial) measures of intangible assets such as brand image into the incentive structure may improve production decisions.
Finally, there is a significant body of accounting research related to ex ante capacity planning decisions (e.g., Balachandran et al. 1997; Sivaramakrishnan 2001, 2002; Banker and Hughes 1994; Buchheit 2003) . 2 There are also studies examining the costs associated with "congestion" (e.g., Banker et al. 1988; Balakrishnan and Soderstrom 2000) , and the ex post capacity decisions that may lead to cost "stickiness" (Anderson et al. 2002; Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Anderson and Lanen 2007) . Our study contributes to this literature by examining, not the capacity decision itself, but the subsequent production decisions that are made as the result decisions leading to excess capacity and in the context of firms' cost accounting and performance measurement systems.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory and research questions, and Section 3 describes the research setting. We present the field evidence in Section 4 and the archival analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Theory and Research Questions
Most firms build capacity in excess of the amount required to meet current production.
Excess capacity is useful when demand is uncertain (Banker, Datar, and Kekre 1988) , or unavoidable when capacity decisions are lumpy. However, most firms do not view large amounts of excess capacity as desirable (Varian 1984; Buchheit 2003) . Because excess capacity results in higher reported fixed (or period) costs per unit in traditional absorption-oriented financial and managerial accounting systems, when firms have excess capacity, managers have an incentive to produce in excess of demand. Facing potential inventory buildup, they then identify mechanisms to dispose of the excess production, such as by offering sales discounts to customers. In the short run, as long as revenues exceed the full absorption cost of production, this strategy improves financial performance in firms whose accounting systems do not separately identify the cost of excess capacity. However, prices serve as a signal of quality and hence over a longer time period, extensive use of sales incentives can have strong negative signals to customers, especially in settings where customers have incomplete information about products (Balachander and Srinivasan 1994; Kalita, Jagpal and Lehmann (2004) . Therefore sales incentives can have negative effects on brand image in the long run, and to the extent that these unaccounted for marginal intangible costs of brand erosion result in future realized accounting costs or future decrease in revenues, firm performance will suffer.
While prior accounting research provides empirical support for a relation between customer-related intangible assets and financial outcomes (e.g., Banker et al. 2000; Behn and Riley 1999; Ittner and Larcker 1998; Dikolli et al. 2007 ) and between customer-related intangible assets and market value (Barth, Clement, Foster, and Kasznik 1998; Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart 2003; Rajgopal, Venkatachalam, and Kotha 2003) , extant research has not explored the influence of production decisions on the value of customer-related intangible assets, nor has it examined the accounting and performance measurement determinants of those production decisions.
We first consider how accounting systems and, in particular, the accounting for capacity costs, can affect production decisions. Accounting systems in most manufacturing firms are based on absorption costing in which fixed manufacturing overhead is allocated to product costs (i.e., product costs fully "absorb" all costs of production, including fixed costs). One limitation of managerial accounting systems in many firms is that they do not separately identify the costs of excess capacity, and hence excess capacity results in a higher fixed or period cost per unit of produced output (Cooper and Kaplan 1992) .
Accounting theory suggests that allocations should be based on practical capacity-that is, the capacity of production with allowance for downtime due to, e.g., maintenance. This ensures that excess capacity costs are not charged to current production (Cooper and Kaplan 1992) , thereby preserving the accuracy of product costs and presumably improving pricing, production, and capacity investment decisions. Consistent with this, Buchheit (2003) These guidelines provide enough leeway for a range of denominators to be used in the computation of fixed overhead allocation rates. It is this leeway that provides an opportunity for firms to lower per unit costs with increased production and thereby improve short-term financial performance. In sum, increased budgeted production decreases unit cost because fixed costs are spread over a larger number of units. This provides a primary motivation for managers to make excess production decisions.
Performance measurement systems in firms also contribute to managers' incentives to engage in excess production. Most firms have performance measurement systems which evaluate managers based on cost reduction relative to a budget. These budgetary goals typically use expected production as the denominator, instead of practical capacity as prescribed by accounting theory. This provides incentives to managers to increase production even in excess of expected demand, as long as the variable accounting cost of production is lower than the expected marginal accounting revenue.
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Taken together, a combination of accounting system shortcomings and a short-term decision orientation induced by performance measurement systems can lead to a persistent tendency among firms to increase production volume to cover fixed costs and lower total unit costs. While excess production may yield short-term revenue gains, it has several disadvantages.
First, the company has to generate demand for the excess production by increasing advertising and by offering customer incentives that can be of a sizable magnitude. Second, excess production is associated with additional costs related to storage, obsolescence, and warranty claims, and these costs are incurred with a lag and possibly even at a different point in the value chain. Finally, and importantly for our research, provision of incentives may lead to an erosion of brand image (e.g., as reflected in lower unit residual values for all products produced by the firm) in the long-run. Any such damage to the brand image is likely to be reflected in lower customer satisfaction and loyalty that may even have negative spillover effects on the success of other products of a firm. Ultimately, brand image erosion results in a reduction in long-term firm value.
The relationships that we examine in this research are shown in Figure through 9 using archival data from the US auto industry.
Research Setting
We examine Toyota, Nissan, and Honda (see Figure 2) . Reasons for the decline in the competitiveness of US automakers include the superior reputation of Japanese cars in both design quality and style, and the ability of Japanese automakers to build higher brand loyalty (Regassa and Ahmedian 2007; Train and Winston 2007) . As a result of the decrease in market share, the US auto industry has been plagued with excess capacity, estimated at about 20 percent (Carson 2003) .
Second, US automakers have a cost structure that is highly leveraged (i.e., a greater proportion of fixed costs relative to variable costs). A significant fixed cost burden for Big Three US firms (and to a lesser extent foreign automakers producing in the US) accrues from health care and pension costs of retired employees, as well as committed contracts with labor. For example, healthcare related costs account for approximately $1,500 for every vehicle produced by General Motors (Murray 2005) and every employee supports two-and-a-half pensioners (Klier 2004 ).
Finally, incentive structures in the auto industry encourage excess production. Most US automakers have performance measurement systems that place considerable emphasis on short term cost reduction and managerial compensation is based on short-term accounting performance measures (Tay 2007) , which exacerbates the incentives to overproduce. In addition, automakers recognize revenue when the product is shipped to the dealer, rather than when the product is sold to the final customer. Hence, in the short term, excess production allows a firm to report greater revenues as well as lower unit costs, and thereby increase short-term income.
As anecdotal evidence of these production practices, in October 2006 Chrysler executives revealed to analysts and investors that the company had been producing far in excess of demand, just to fill capacity (Henry 2007) . Auto analysts had already noticed in the summer of 2006 that over 100,000 Chrysler vehicles were idling in the Detroit area (Maynard 2006) . Similarly, during
December 2006, GM had more than one million vehicles in stock in the US. In 2006, GM had about 41,000 vehicles for every one percent market share in the US; whereas Toyota had only 16,000 vehicles of inventory per percent of its market share (Boudette and White 2007) .
Moreover, the business press has noted the correlation between overproduction and provision of incentives (Maynard 2006) . A Wall Street Journal article notes: "Detroit automakers still tend to push sales using big discounts, a tactic that undermines both brand image and the resale value that customers get when they trade in or sell their car" (Boudette and White 2007) .
Field Evidence on the Determinants and Consequences of Excess Production

Interview Protocol
To obtain detailed insights into the organizational dynamics that encourage excess production, we conducted field interviews at one of the Big Three automakers. Such information cannot be obtained from secondary sources and hence field-based research provides an opportunity to study these questions in greater detail. Our objective was to discern the role of capacity accounting and performance measurement systems in encouraging excess production in the presence of excess capacity. We further sought to get managers' perceptions regarding the consequences of any such excess production. We describe the insights from our field interviews below.
Interviews were facilitated by the strategy group within the organization. The interviews were conducted over a two-day period in late 2006 with ten managers having titles of directors of strategy, HR, finance, production planning, costing, market research, sales, transportation, and dealer management. Each interview lasted approximately one-an-one-half hours. Although a basic interview protocol was followed, the interviews were primarily open-ended to allow interviewees to provide unique perspectives on the issue of overproduction by the firm.
Following these interviews, we held weekly phone meetings with two key contacts from the strategy group from January, 2007 through June, 2007. These meetings were used to clarify insights from the interviews and to facilitate data collection and interpretation. In the following subsection, we describe results from interviews with key decision-makers in the firm regarding production planning, performance measurement, and accounting practices.
Field Evidence on the Determinants of Excess Production
Our interviews revealed that the accounting system encourages an excessive focus on short-term financial performance and hampers long-term strategic thinking. The firm uses a standard absorption costing system. Labor rates are obtained from the industrial engineering department, and the manufacturing finance department provides the overhead burden rate. The manager of product costing said that the overhead burden rate is based on estimated overhead cost divided by expected plant volume. When we inquired whether excess capacity costs were separately identified, the product manager responded that "excess capacity costs are not separated."
The failure of the accounting system to separate excess capacity costs results in variability in costs arising from fluctuations in production that may or may not reflect demand fluctuations. Because the responsibility for meeting unit cost targets is assigned to plant managers, these managers have an incentive to increase production to lower unit costs. In 2006, the company was operating at only 56% of its installed capacity and about 50% of total manufacturing costs were fixed. Plant managers admitted that the high fixed costs and low capacity utilization encouraged them to "build more to reduce unit costs."
Lack of accounting for excess capacity has a salient effect early in the production planning process, when the firm is in the process of forecasting demand. The production planning department uses the projections of "free demand" (i.e., demand absent any customer incentives) generated by the economics department as the starting point for determining production quantity. It then consults with marketing/sales to obtain an estimate of sales quantity.
Based on these two numbers, if the production quantity is "not good enough," (i.e., production is inadequate to absorb the costs to obtain the targeted cost per unit), the production planning managers explore options such as offering additional features, or tweaking the price to increase demand. Based on the production planning department's estimates of the potential increase in demand that can be generated via these changes, a new free demand estimate is generated. Note, however, that although these are referred to as free demand numbers, they are not free in the sense that they have already been inflated. Although these final demand estimates are already optimistic, a combined decision is made to produce "a little more -to fill capacity." The manager of strategy remarked "basically we talk ourselves into overproduction." Thus, our interviews suggest that failure to account for excess capacity contributes to the relation between excess capacity and excess production ( Figure 1 , Link 1).
The performance measurement system at this firm exacerbates the tendency for excess production. The firm uses a balanced scorecard to evaluate and reward the performance of managers at corporate, divisional, and plant levels. The performance measures that are used to evaluate manufacturing include: fixed cost, program spending, material cost, plant cost, variable cost, and cost per vehicle. As a result, there is an incentive to overproduce to improve cost per vehicle and justify the expenditures on fixed cost, program spending, and plant cost. All these costs have a fixed component that decline on a per-unit basis when production volume (the denominator) increases. As a result, even though production managers are aware that the demand estimates are optimistic, the performance measurement system discourages reducing production quantity if demand is lower than expected, because then unit costs increase, and as one manager remarked "profit targets would not be met."
Indeed, a factor that further encourages excess production is that upper-level managers at the firm are held strictly accountable for short-term profit targets. As a result, as long as there was a non-zero short-term contribution margin per unit, excess production increased short-term financial performance. The excessive focus on short-term financial performance was apparent in many interviews. The manager of production planning remarked:
The issue is that when the executive committee approves those volumes, they have been overly optimistic-extremely overly optimistic. And this is where the truth comes out. And again, this is the crux of the problem-in order to make the money-the profit targets-you have to build more units. So, even though the [marketing department managers] come back and say, "Listen, we really can't sell that many units," they are told: "You have to sell more units, because otherwise we can't hit the profit number." And so we find a way to sell more units. Thus our field evidence suggests that the performance measurement system does indeed contribute to excess production ( Figure 1 , Link 2). Managers were also aware that the excess production decisions had a number of negative consequences such as additional quality-related warranty costs. One manager commented "No one will argue that it [warranty cost] increases as vehicles sit in our storage yards, collecting dust." An internal study done in 2004 showed that vehicles that were stored for 360 days cost the company $50 more per vehicle in warranty than those sold within 60 days, primarily arising from body repairs, cleaning dirty interiors, and replacing drained batteries, cracked windshields, or tires.
Field Evidence on the Consequences of Excess Production
While managers felt that there were few other options to meet the performance targets, they also acknowledged that excess production was not desirable. Managers were aware that excess production was hurting long-term revenues and costs via its impact on residual values and its impact on customer expectations. The manager of fleets and residual values remarked:
The residual value piece of it is a lagging cost. And it's also a hidden cost that doesn't get accounted. …We go out and we talk to ALG [Automotive Lease Guide], and we tell them what a great vehicle we have; and we tell them that we're going to build 50,000 of these things. And they say: "Oh, if you're going to build 50,000 then I think your residual is 48." And they come back, and they look at the volumes that we're actually producing, and they see that we didn't build 50,000, we built 75,000 units. Well, they lose faith. Managers also remarked that once the firm is locked into an excess production and sell-via-incentive mindset, it becomes very difficult to get out of this process. The manager of strategy remarked: "You don't necessarily want to fall on your sword for the sake of a long-term profit down the road, because you may not be the one that's in the chair when those long-term profits come to roost. So, we get into this short-term cycle." Thus, the excess production strategy persists despite the fact that, as one manager notes, "It degrades the product."
We explored with the managers whether provision of incentives was tied to an overall sales strategy, rather than a function of the production planning process described above. Data that the company shared with us for three representative nameplates (Figure 3 ) reveal that a significant proportion of greater-than-anticipated incentives were specifically linked to actual sales lower than sales projected during the production planning process. As an example, actual rebates per unit were 1.33 times higher than planned for Nameplate 1 as a result of actual sales 40 percent lower than planned sales. One of the managers remarked about the Figure 3 data:
As our [performance] target slips further away, our reaction is to increase incentives, thus deteriorating the total cost of ownership …. This sales strategy is a short-term strategy that has obviously run its course.
In 2006, a team of production managers and suppliers came to the following conclusions that were presented to the firm's executive committee:
Remember that the {omitted $} Billion cost that we identified is just the tip of the iceberg. There are other costs of considerable magnitude associated with [excess production] that are yet to be considered and that could make this a {omitted $, 10X} Billion cost. …We've shown you why this model contradicts every pillar of our corporate strategy, which defines how we should operate to be successful today and tomorrow. …Establishing realistic sales targets will help us avoid falling into a heavy 'push' situation again. We need to build based on what the customer wants and the market will take. We cannot continue to stumble over and over and not learn the lesson, and our executives need to demand realistic targets. …we need the discipline to measure our progress to those targets, and raise the flag when we are in trouble…We need to make sure that decisions being made along the way, every day, by all of us, are aligned to our corporate strategy, and judged for their short term benefits as well as their long term effects. (emphasis added)
Taken together, our field interviews suggest that it is the complex interplay between production planning, performance measurement, and accounting practices within this organization that evolved into the currently observed practice of producing in excess of (free) demand and then selling via costly customer incentives. While these managers intuited that this pattern has detrimental brand image effects as well, they had no empirical evidence of this damage, nor did they have an incentive to document this damage because the intangible costs of brand image erosion occur with a lag and are not incorporated into the performance measurement and accounting system. In the following section we present archival evidence that the field observations hold more generally, and that the negative effects of excess production include, not only the tangible costs of customer rebates, advertising, and inventory build-up, but also the intangible cost of brand image erosion.
Archival Analysis of the Determinants and Consequences of Excess Production
The archival analysis uses monthly and annual data at the nameplate level for the period [2005] [2006] . The data used for the analysis of the association between excess capacity and excess production, and between excess production and the tangible costs of advertising spend, customer rebate incentives, and inventory build-up are comprised of 2,364 monthly observations. Included in these data are 132 nameplates; 103 nameplates from the Big Three US automakers and 29
nameplates from foreign automakers ( observations. Below we define the variables used in the archival analysis (i.e., measured variables in Figure 1 ) and the sources for data collection.
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Excess Capacity (%): Because field interviews indicate that production scheduling commences approximately one year ahead of production dates, we base the computation of excess capacity on information know one year in advance of the production date. We assume that capacity investment decisions are known well in advance and, thus, use contemporaneous (to the actual production date) annual capacity estimates (divided by twelve to convert to monthly capacity).
We measure excess capacity in two ways: (i) the difference between monthly nameplate production capacity and nameplate production forecasted one year prior, scaled by monthly nameplate production capacity (Excess Capacity (%) -forecast), and (ii) the difference between monthly nameplate production capacity and actual nameplate production in the same month of the prior year, scaled by monthly nameplate production capacity (Excess Capacity (%) -actual).
Capacity data were computed from annual capacity estimates obtained from the Autofacts database (PWC Automotive Institute, http://www.pwcautomotiveinstitute.com/). Forecasted production data were acquired from Global Insight (http://www.globalinsight.com/). Actual production data were obtained from the PWC Autofacts database.
Excess Production (%): We measure monthly excess production as actual nameplate production minus one-year-ahead forecasted production, scaled by one-year-ahead forecasted production.
Actual production data were obtained from the PWC Autofacts database. Penetration is the percentage of sales made at a rebate. This can range from zero percent, which implies that no units are sold at a rebate, to 100 percent, which implies that all sales are rebated.
Both rebate percentage and rebate penetration data are monthly data and are obtained from the JD Power and Associates Topline Report.
Advertising: Monthly advertising spend data were acquired from TNS Media Intelligence (http://www.tns-mi.com/). These data are for nameplate-specific advertising across all media forms (i.e., print, television, radio). We use both a measure of total spend (Advertising Spend), and a measure of spend per unit sold (Advertising Spend Per Unit).
Inventory Build-up: Inventory build-up is associated with increased storage and transportation costs. We use a measure of days sales in inventory as a proxy for inventory build-up. Days
Inventory is defined as the number of days it takes to sell (using actual subsequent sales) the current month's production. This variable has a minimum value of zero where zero implies that the current month production is less than the current month sales. Monthly nameplate level sales for all automakers were obtained from our field research partner. In our annual tests of the associations between customer rebates, advertising, and inventory buildup and the APEAL Index, we again include controls for US automakers, suspended production, auto segments, and a time period indicator (in this case, an indicator for the year 2006). In addition, we control for production quality, nameplate competition, financing terms, and customer demographics. First, in the auto industry the JD Power and Associates
Initial Quality Survey (IQS) serves as the industry benchmark for assessing new-vehicle quality (Selko 2006) . The IQS measures quality problems experienced by owners at 90 days of ownership. The IQS captures two categories of quality: design quality, and quality of production (i.e., defects and malfunctions). We use the JD Power IQS PP100 (problems per 100) data to control for product quality. Second, we include the number of nameplates as a control for segment competition. Third, we include as controls three financing term variables, the percentage of sales in which financing is done through the automaker (Captive), the mean down payment (Total Down), and the mean annual percentage rate (APR) for financed vehicles.
Finally, to control for differences in customer demographics across nameplates, we include measures of the average customer age (Avg Age) and the percent of female customers (Gender)
for a given nameplate. The finance terms and customer demographic data were collected from the JD Power and Associates Topline Report Table 2 , Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for the monthly data and Panel B contains the correlations among monthly variables. Panels C and D contain the descriptive statistics and correlations for the annual data.
Empirical Models
Figure 1, Link 3 predicts that excess capacity is associated with excess production. We use the following linear model with an AR (1) be positive indicating that excess capacity is associated with excess production.
We expect that excess production is associated with a number of tangible costs, including customer rebates (Figure 1 [ Next, we examine the effect of the tangible short-term costs of excess production on the long-term intangible cost of brand image erosion. We predict that customer rebates are negatively associated with brand image (Figure 1 , Link 7) based on prior research that associates higher prices with superior quality and discounts with inferior quality (Styhre and Kohn 2006) .
We also predict that when excess production results in excess inventory, deterioration in brand image results as customers observe inventory being held in public places (e.g., mall parking lots) (Figure 1 , Link 9). Advertising also influences brand image, but the direction of the influence is unclear. On the one hand, advertising can increase brand image, especially when it focuses on the firm and other strong brands. On the other hand, excessive advertising of incentives can reduce brand image. We use the following model to test the effect of customer incentives, advertising, and inventory buildup on brand image: 
where [Advertising] is either Advertising Spend (i.e., raw dollars), or Advertising Spend Per Unit. We expect the coefficients on Rebates % and Rebate Penetration, " 2 and " 2 , to be negative.
We expect the coefficient on Days Inventory, " 4 , to also be negative. We use clustered standard errors at the nameplate level to control for multiple observations for the same nameplate. Table 3 provides the results of testing Figure 1 , Link 3 (equation 1), and examines the association between excess production levels and excess capacity. The results indicate a significant positive coefficient on excess capacity measured using forecasted production (Model 1) and using actual production in the same month of the prior year (Model 2). A one percentage point increase in excess capacity using forecasted (one year prior actual) production is associated with a 0.491 (0.04) percentage point increase in excess production. Thus, these results suggest that when firms have excess capacity, they produce in excess of one-year-ahead production forecasts. Typically, firms make decisions to increase plant capacity when there is unmet demand. However, the results in Table 3 suggest that excess plant capacity is associated with excess production. This provides archival evidence consistent with the insights gleaned from the field interviews; namely, that when accounting systems neglect to separately account for excess capacity, and performance measurement systems place excessive focus on short-term performance, firms increase production in order to "absorb" the costs of excess capacity.
Empirical Results
The results in Table 3 also indicate a negative coefficient on the Suspended Production control variable. In addition, Number of Plants is positively associated with excess production.
Thus, even controlling for excess capacity, excess production is greater for nameplates produced at multiple plants, as compared to those produced at only one plant.
Next we examine the association between excess production on the tangible costs of customer rebates, advertising, and inventory buildup (equation 2). The results in Table 4 , Model 1 indicate that excess production is associated with higher rebates as a percentage of total sales price. The results also indicate that US firms provide significantly higher rebates relative to non-US firms. Number of Plants is significantly positively related to rebate percentage, which is consistent with our previous results that number of plants is associated with excess production and thereby with the provision of additional rebates. In Model 2, the coefficient on rebate percentage is not statistically significant. Rebate penetration measures the proportion of vehicles that are sold at a rebate, and it may be that it takes a longer time period for excess production to manifest in the form of higher rebate penetration, although additional tests of a one month lag failed to find a significant relation. The US indicator in Model 2 has a positive coefficient, which
indicates that a greater proportion of vehicles of US automakers are sold at a rebate as compared to non-US automakers. In sum, these results provide partial support for Link 4 in Figure 1 that excess production is associated with increased customer incentives.
The association between excess production and advertising is provided in Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 . In both columns, excess production is positively associated with advertising spend as predicted in Figure 1 , Link 5. Rebate percent is negatively associated with advertising spend.
These results suggest that although automakers increase their advertising expenditures when they have to create demand for excess production, the additional advertising dollars are not tied to promotion of customer incentives and, in fact, may be in lieu of customer incentives. Finally, Table 4 , Model 5 indicates a positive association between excess production and Days Inventory, which is consistent with Link 6 in Figure 1 .
We next examine the effects of rebates, advertising, and inventory build-up on the intangible cost of brand image as measured by the APEAL Index. Table 5 contains the results of testing Figure 1 , Links 7-9 (equation 3). Model 1 presents the results when advertising spend is included as an explanatory variable, and Model 2 presents the results with advertising spend per unit as an explanatory variable. In both models, the coefficient on Rebate % and Rebate
Penetration are negative and statistically significant, consistent with Link 7 in Figure 1 . Every one percent increase in Rebate % is associated with about a two point decline in the APEAL Index; a one percent increase in Rebate Penetration is associated with a 0.2 point decline in the APEAL Index.
While there is no statistically significant association between total Advertising Spend and brand image (Model 1), Advertising Spend Per Unit is associated with an increase in brand image (Model 2). Days Inventory is negatively associated with the APEAL Index in both Model 1 and Model 2, indicating that brand image is harmed by inventory buildup (Link 9 in Figure 1 ).
In sum, our empirical analyses reveal the following. Excess capacity is associated with excess production, even after controlling for seasonality and for differences in product categories. This excess production is, in turn, associated with higher rebates (but not contemporaneous rebate penetration) and with increased advertising and inventory buildup. Both higher rebates and higher rebate penetration are associated with lower brand image, as is increased inventory buildup. Advertising, however, is positively associated with brand image as measured by the APEAL Index. The results are summarized in Figure 4 .
Conclusions
Three characteristics of accounting and performance measurement systems in firms can lead to distorted production decisions. First is the tendency of accounting systems to assign excess capacity costs to current production, which increases unit cost when production decreases.
The second characteristic is the neglect of long-term costs, especially intangible costs by traditional accounting systems. The third characteristic is the tendency for firms to design performance measurement systems that place a high degree of emphasis on short-term costs. The net effect is that managers benefit in the short-run by increasing production.
Excess production results in costly inventory buildup and leads firms to increase advertising and/or to offer customer incentives in order to sell the excess inventory, all of which can harm brand image. However, since accounting systems do not highlight the adverse impact of poor production strategies on long-term intangible assets such as brand image, such strategies perpetuate. This paper examines the effect of excess production on both tangible and intangible costs, i.e., brand image erosion. We use field evidence from a major Big Three US automaker to
show that failure to account for excess capacity and a focus on short-term performance measures encourage managers to increase production. We then examine the extent to which our field observations generalize to the industry as a whole.
We use archival data for the US automotive industry to show an association between excess capacity and increased production. We also empirically find that increased production is associated with increased costs in the form of higher customer incentives (i.e., rebates), higher advertising expenditures, and greater inventory buildup. Finally, we find that inventory buildup and higher customer incentives in the form of both rebate percentages and rebate penetration are associated with lower brand image. Taken together, we interpret our field and archival analysis as evidence that the complex interplay between production planning, performance measurement, and accounting practices in the US auto industry have evolved into observed production and marketing practices.
Our study speaks to the importance of adequately accounting for excess capacity costs.
While accounting theorists have long promoted the use of practical production capacity as the denominator for computing fixed cost allocation rates, it is not uncommon for firms to deviate from this in practice and use expected production. The result is a distorted incentive to increase production as a means of lowering per unit costs. Our study also responds to the growing recognition in the academic and practitioner communities of the importance of considering the role of intangible assets in value creation (e.g., Ashton 2005) . The study is unique in that we examine the determinants of production decisions and the extent to which production decisions affect one important intangible asset, brand image. Firms often employ a short-term financial mindset and fail to consider the long-term implications of production strategies on brand value.
While production in excess of demand may be desirable to increase short-term revenues and margins, they are likely to lower revenues and margins in the long run. In many industries, like in the auto industry, firms have access to rich sources of brand image data such as the JD Power APEAL indices used in this study. Incorporating these indices into performance measurement and reward systems could provide the necessary incentives to ensure that the intangible costs of decisions not captured by the accounting system are internalized by the decision-makers within the firm. 
